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COMPULSORY LICENSING OF CLIMATE
ENGINEERING PATENTS: HOW EMBRACING
TECHNOLOGY- AND RESEARCHING-SHARING
STRATEGIES BRINGS US ONE STEP CLOSER TO
SOLVING CLIMATE CHANGE
Buzz Hardin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The impact of climate change spans the globe and includes
increasingly severe and dangerous climate events, including
coastal flooding, extreme heat and wildfires, reduced crop yield,
and decreased food security.1 In the United States, if the proper
steps toward mitigating or reversing the effects of climate change
are not taken, it is very likely that the United States will
experience substantial damage to its economy, the health of its
citizens, and the environment.2 In response to the challenges
presented by climate change, the number of inventions in the field
of climate engineering, or “geoengineering,” has skyrocketed
over the past several years, and the number of patent applications
and grants for technologies in that field has similarly increased
dramatically.3
Because of the vital importance of mitigating the effects of
climate change, and by extension, the importance of guaranteeing
access to the types of technologies that, when properly developed,
*

J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Arkansas School of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Sara Gosman for her enthusiasm and guidance in the writing of this article,
the staff editors at the Arkansas Law Review for their dedication and hard work, his family
and friends for their constant encouragement, and his wife Sarah, with whom he shares in
every success, for her love and support in all things.
1. CORE WRITING TEAM, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 6-11, 13-16 (Rajendra K. Pachauri & Leo
Meyer eds., 2015) [hereinafter IPCC REPORT 2014].
2. Id. at 6-8, 13-16.
3. Anthony E. Chavez, Exclusive Rights to Saving the Planet: The Patenting of
Geoengineering Inventions, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2015).
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may help to achieve such mitigation, it is necessary for these
patented technologies to be easily accessed, assessed, and
improved-upon by the entities and corporations that would use
them to combat climate change.4 Thus, to help guarantee that
these technologies are not repressed or lost to nonuse, the United
States should implement a limited compulsory licensing policy
governing climate engineering patents in the fields of solar
radiation management (SRM) and carbon-dioxide removal
(CDR).
II. BACKGROUND
Society’s need for large-scale intervention in the progress of
global climate change has never been greater, and legislative
action, both nationally in the United States and through
international efforts, has been unable to create a governing
environmental framework that ensures the preservation of human
life in the not-so-distant future.5 In the hopes of enacting largescale change, many inventors and private companies have
researched and developed so-called “climate engineering”
technologies, aimed at mitigating or, in some cases, reversing the
effects of climate change in potentially dramatic and sweeping
ways.6 The number of patents in the realm of climate engineering
has skyrocketed in recent years, resulting in the development of
many technologies that may prove instrumental in combating
climate change in the long term.7 Compulsory licensing presents
one method by which these technologies may be efficiently
researched, disseminated throughout the climate engineering
industry, and improved upon.

4. Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case
for a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOW. L.J. 579, 582-84,
625, 627 (2005).
5. Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering and Climate Management: From Marginality to
Inevitability, 46 TULSA L. REV. 221, 229, 232-33, 241-42 (2010).
6. Chavez, supra note 3, at 5-6.
7. Id. at 2, 5-7, 9-10.
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A. The Realities of Climate Change and the Necessity of
Climate Engineering Solutions
The daunting specter of climate change looms large around
the world. According to the most recent report by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,8 the future risks and
impacts caused by the changing climate span the globe and
include: (1) increased damage from river and coastal flooding; (2)
increased damage from extreme heat events and wildfires; (3)
reduced crop productivity and livelihood and food security; (4)
the increased spread of vector-borne diseases; and (5) a host of
other potentially devastating consequences.9
Additionally, at this point, many of these consequences are
nearly inevitable and, potentially irreversible, even if we were to
entirely cease the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs).10 In the
United States specifically, if the proper steps toward mitigating or
reversing the effects of climate change are not taken, it is very
likely that the United States will experience substantial damage
to its economy, the health of its citizens, and the environment,
with “losses in some sectors . . . estimated to grow to hundreds of
billions of dollars by the end of the century.”11
The resultant damage of global warming to public health and
safety can hardly be understated. If unmitigated, projected deaths
due to heat stroke, cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease,
cerebrovascular disease, and kidney disorders are all likely to
increase if warming is allowed to continue in the United States at
its current pace.12 Additionally, likely health risks arising from
an expected increase in the rate of “extreme events”13 such as
droughts, wildfires, and flooding as a result of extreme
precipitation include but are not limited to preterm birth and low
8. IPCC REPORT 2014, supra note 1, at 13-14.
9. Id. at 14.
10. Id. at 16.
11. 2 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1347 (2018)
[hereinafter USGCRP ASSESSMENT 2018].
12. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON
HUMAN HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES: A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT 51 (David Glick et al.
eds., 2016) [hereinafter USGCRP ASSESSMENT 2016].
13. Id. at 100.
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birth weight of newborns, carbon monoxide poisoning related to
power outages, reduced water quality and quantity, exacerbations
of asthma, and a range of impacts on mental health.14
1. Traditional Means of GHG Reduction and Climate Change
Mitigation Have So Far Proven Inadequate to Prevent Disaster
While this Article will not discuss international governance
of climate change or climate change technologies in detail, it is
important to understand that the limitations of international
institutions and agreements have created a regulatory
environment that, while addressing many of the concerns arising
from climate change, does not go so far as to actually prevent the
disastrous effects of climate change.15 To quote one disenchanted
author, “[n]ot only has [a meaningful abatement in global GHG
emissions] not occurred, but even the fitful starts toward such a
policy have not even been attempted.
Kyoto, Geneva,
Copenhagen—at some point the international community will run
out of cities in which to fail to address climate change.”16 The
Paris Agreement17 under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, for example, “indicates that the
main priority is to hold the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels.”18
While the Paris Agreement was lauded by some at its
conception,19 it has since become clear that its provisions will not

14. Id. at 102.
15. For a brief history of the shortcomings of international coalitions to meaningfully
reduce or plan to reduce GHG emissions, see Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Rethinking a Failing
Framework: Adaptation and Institutional
Rebirth for the Global Climate Change Regime, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 49 (2012)
(“In the context of global climate change, acceptance means acknowledging that a
centralized, consensus based, legally-binding response to climate change cannot suffice.
Acceptance means looking beyond the treaty to find new governance strategies to address a
massive problem that defies traditional solutions.”).
16. Michaelson, supra note 5, at 256.
17. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
18. Jaime Nieto et al., Less Than 2 °C? An Economic-Environmental Evaluation of the
Paris Agreement, 146 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 69, 69 (2018) (emphasis omitted).
19. See Fiona Harvey, Paris Climate Change Agreement: The World’s Greatest
Diplomatic Success, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2015), https://perma.cc/JDB5-F32M; Coral
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be sufficient to reach the 2 °C goal.20 Rather, due in large part to
increases in GHG emissions in China and India, it is more likely
that the global average temperature will continue to rise to
between 3 and 4 °C by 2050.21 Under such conditions there
would be “severe and widespread impacts on unique and
threatened systems, substantial species extinction, large risks to
global and regional food security, consequential constraints on
common human activities, increased likelihood of triggering
tipping points (critical thresholds) and limited potential for
adaptation in some cases . . . .”22
To the extent that specific rules in international regulation of
climate engineering technologies have been implemented, only
the parties to the 1996 London Protocol (itself a corollary of the
previously held London Dumping Convention) and the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) have directly
addressed geoengineering.23 Even in these cases, regulatory
regimes have focused almost exclusively on ocean iron
fertilization, a type of climate engineering which involves the
adding of iron (in the form of a dissolved iron sulfate) to ocean
waters in order to facilitate the growth of phytoplankton, which
in turn draw carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere and into the
ocean, slowing the effects of global warming.24
The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the Convention) is an
international agreement intended to control marine pollution by
dumping, as well as to encourage regional agreements pertaining
to the same.25 Currently, there are eighty-seven Parties to the
Convention, including the United States, in which the
Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2015), https://perma.cc/889D-4C8P.
20. Elizabeth Burleson, Climate-Energy Sinks and Sources: Paris Agreement and
Dynamic Federalism, 28 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016).
21. Nieto et al., supra note 18, at 77-78, 80.
22. IPCC REPORT 2014, supra note 1, at 77.
23. Karen N. Scott, International Law in the Anthropocene: Responding to the
Geoengineering Challenge, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 309, 311, 337, 339 (2013).
24. ERIC-MARTIAL TAKAM TAKOUGANG, IRON FERTILIZATION IN THE OCEAN AND
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE GLOBAL CARBON CYCLE 7-8 (2007).
25. 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120
[hereinafter London Convention].
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Convention’s requirements are implemented in the Marine
Protection, Research Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
(MPRSA).26 The CBD is a multilateral international treaty
created with the intent of conserving biodiversity globally and
encouraging the “fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising
out of the [use] of genetic resources.”27 The CBD has called upon
nations to ensure that ocean fertilization does not take place
without adequate scientific justification28 and has emphasized the
importance of caution in relation to ocean fertilization and
geoengineering activities more generally.29
However, research into ocean iron fertilization represents
only a fraction of the total of climate engineering research,30 and
climate engineering methods and technologies are advancing
much more quickly than the slow cogs of an international
regulatory regime can turn.31 Furthermore, with the United
States’ future as a party to the Paris Agreement far from certain,32
it is clear that the Paris Agreement, despite a noble effort, will be
unable to rise to the challenges presented by climate change in an
effective or meaningful way. Thus, the necessity of developing
climate change mitigation solutions alternative to the traditional
international agreement is increasingly urgent.
2. Climate Engineering as a Means of Mitigating and Reversing
Climate Change
With the current state of international GHG emission
regulation ineffective to stop the rapidly increasing rate of

26. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, INT’L MAR. ORG., https://perma.cc/W5JN-3D9Q (last visited Sept. 28, 2020);
Ocean Dumping: International Treaties, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://perma.cc/5EXB-DHWD.
27. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
28. Scott, supra note 23, at 332.
29. Id. at 332.
30. In addition to sequestration of carbon in the oceans, processes have been developed
for carbon sequestration in terrestrial soil, as well as geological disposal of CO2. See Lisa
Dilling et al., The Role of Carbon Cycle Observations and Knowledge in Carbon
Management, 28 ANN. REV. ENV’T RES. 521, 526, 528 (2003).
31. Nieto et al., supra note 18, at 79-80.
32. Lisa Friedman, Trump Administration to Begin Official Withdrawal From Paris
Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/7VYG-5826.
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emission and ecological destruction,33 states are increasingly
considering climate engineering options as alternatives to
emissions reduction plans.34 The term “climate engineering,” or
“geoengineering,”35 refers to “a broad set of methods and
technologies operating on a large scale that aim to deliberately
alter the climate system in order to alleviate the impacts of climate
change.”36 Climate engineering technologies are generally
divided into two categories: (1) carbon dioxide removal (CDR),
which entails removing GHGs directly from the Earth’s
atmosphere; and (2) solar radiation management (SRM), which
involves increasing the reflectivity of the Earth’s atmosphere or
surface.37
The aim of CDR technologies is to remove GHGs from the
Earth’s atmosphere.38 To this end, a number of technologies and
polices have been proposed—varying widely in scope, cost, and
potential
environmental
implications—including:
(1)
reforestation of deforested land to promote the absorption of
carbon by foliage; (2) the sequestration of carbon as biochar or
other organic materials; (3) the capture and transfer of GHGs
from the atmosphere into natural “sinks” such as underground
cave systems; (4) and the addition of iron sulfate to the oceans to
propagate phytoplankton that consume atmospheric carbon.39
SRM, unlike CDR, does not endeavor to decrease the
amount of GHGs in the Earth’s atmosphere. Instead, its aim is to
decrease the portion of solar radiation that reaches or is absorbed
by the surface of the planet.40 SRM covers a wide array of
technologies and policies ranging from the mundane to the
extraterrestrial, including managing the amount of the sun’s
radiation that is reflected back into space by changing the color
33. Nieto et al., supra note 18, at 80-81.
34. Scott, supra note 28, at 318.
35. The terms “climate engineering” and “geoengineering” are used interchangeably
throughout literature on the subject. However, “climate engineering” is potentially the more
accurate of the two and will be favored throughout this Article.
36. IPCC REPORT 2014, supra note 1, at 89.
37. KELSI BRACMORT & RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RES. SERV., R41371,
GEOENGINEERING: GOVERNANCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 1-2 (2013).
38. Geoengineering: Parts I, II, and III: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech.,
111th Cong. 5 (2010) [hereinafter Geoengineering: I, II, and III].
39. Geoengineering: I, II, and III, supra note 38 at 5-6.
40. Id. at 6.
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of our rooftops to white or even modifying portions of the earth’s
natural land cover to make them more reflective.41 Potentially
more extreme options include spraying sulfates into the
stratosphere to mirror the kind of radiation absorption that occurs
following volcanic eruptions, injecting salt water or sulfuric acid
into the troposphere to promote cloud formation, and even
launching reflective satellites into the Earth’s orbit.42
3. The State of Climate Engineering Patents in the United States
Today
In the United States, funding for research into climate
engineering technologies is largely a private, corporate affair.
“The United States lacks a dedicated research program, with
existing geoengineering research efforts occurring largely as part
of broader climate and atmospheric science programs.”43 While
the theater of American politics features a few outspoken
proponents of climate engineering,44 federal funding of research
in the field remains minimal, with an estimated total of less than
$2 million going directly to that pursuit in 2010.45 However, in
2017, federal scientists recommended for the first time that the
United States government begin funding research into the
efficacy and mitigating potential of climate engineering
technologies.46 Thus, the United States seems primed to join the
private sector in providing meaningful funding for such
technologies.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Albert C. Lin, The Missing Pieces of Geoengineering Research Governance,
100 MINN. L. REV. 2509, 2521 (2016) (citing GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10903, CLIMATE CHANGE: A COORDINATED STRATEGY COULD FOCUS FEDERAL
GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH AND INFORM GOVERNANCE EFFORTS 19 (2010)).
44. See, e.g., Alexander C. Kaufman, A Longshot 2020 Candidate Wants to Push
Geoengineering into the Climate Debate, HUFFPOST (June 26, 2019),
https://perma.cc/TD6Y-3HG5 (“[Andrew] Yang’s embrace of geoengineering marks what
could be a political turning point for an issue long written off as too risky and fatalistic to
seriously consider―too much the stuff of science fiction.”).
45. Lin, supra note 43, at 2521.
46. Geoengineering: I, II, and III, supra note 38, at 48 (prepared statement of Alan
Robock) (recommending that the United States “embark on a well-funded research program
to ‘consider geoengineering’s potential benefits, to understand its limitations, and to avoid
ill-considered deployment.’”).
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The Clean Air Act (CAA) is one of the few pieces of
legislation which already allows the EPA some level of control
over climate engineering research projects.47 Additionally, “[t]he
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) might, under
circumstances such as public funding of research or large-scale
outdoor SCE activities, require an environmental impact
assessment or a programmatic environmental impact statement if
the risks were thought to be significant.”48
III. ANALYSIS
Although the United States Congress has historically
shunned the notion of creating a general compulsory licensing
statute and actual instances of compulsory licensing in the United
States are limited, the international community provides a number
of possible frameworks from which the United States may be able
to borrow in crafting legislation providing specifically for the
compulsory licensing of climate engineering patents.49 Evidence
of Congress’s willingness over the past several decades to adopt
limited, albeit significant, pieces of legislation with provisions for
the compulsory licensing of patented technologies in particular
industries suggests that, should such a provision be implemented
for climate engineering patents, public policy considerations of

47. 42 U.S.C. § 7403 (Research, investigation, training, and other activities). In
relevant part, the Clean Air Act provides:
(a) Research and development program for prevention and control of air
pollution The Administrator shall establish a national research
and development program for the prevention and control of air pollution
and as part of such program shall—
(1) conduct, and promote the coordination and acceleration of, research,
investigations, experiments, demonstrations, surveys, and studies relating
to the causes, effects (including health and welfare effects), extent, prevention,
and control of air pollution[.]
42 U.S.C. § 7403.
48. Jesse L. Reynolds et al., Solar Climate Engineering and Intellectual Property:
Toward a Research Commons, 18 MIN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 15-16 (2017).
49. See, e.g., Naval Satarawala Chopra & Dinoo Muthappa, The Curious Case of
Compulsory Licensing in India, COMPETITION L. INT’L, Aug. 2012, at 34, 35.
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public health, public safety, and general welfare would be
cornerstones of that legislation.50
A. Compulsory Licensing of Climate Engineering Patents
Despite its relative infancy, the number of patents (both
patent applications and patents granted) in the field of climate
engineering has skyrocketed in recent years.51 One “author
directed a review of USPTO records to determine trends in
applications for and granting of patents involving climateengineering technologies[,]” including both SRM and CDR
technologies.52 The findings of the study were as follows:
[B]efore 2008, the combined number of patent
applications and patents granted for geoengineering
technologies did not exceed twenty in a single year.
However, the total exceeded forty in 2009, and
eventually increased to more than one hundred in 2013.
Moreover, the rate at which the USPTO has granted
these patents has similarly increased. For instance, the
USPTO never granted more than ten such patents
annually before 2010. Four years later, the annual
number of geoengineering patents granted increased
nearly tenfold. In sum, both the number of patents
granted and applications filed illustrate startling growth
over the past four years.53
Of these patent applications and grants, CDR methods
constituted more than 90%, with “particle-dispersion” and “solarray-reflection” technologies constituting only 4% and 2% of all
climate geoengineering patents, respectively.54 Along with the
rise in number of climate engineering patents, a number of
authors have raised serious concerns that the patenting of climate
engineering technologies could result in an industry where
development of the technologies that could be used to save the

50. See Susan Vastano Vaughan, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under
TRIPS: What Standard of Compensation?, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 88-89
(2001).
51. Chavez, supra note 3, at 5-6.
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id. at 10.
54. Id. at 10-11.
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planet is actually hindered, and access to those technologies
limited.55 The “[p]atenting of geoengineering technologies could
have serious negative impacts by creating a culture of secrecy that
could delay much-needed developments.”56
Climate engineering initiatives undertaken by private
companies create the potential for these technologies to be
deployed without a thorough assessment of the ecological risk
involved.57 Because of the potentially rapid and widespread
ecological effects of some climate engineering technologies,
possession of these technologies by a small number of private
individuals or corporations is certainly troubling.58 Furthermore,
just as allowing a small number of individuals to have access to
powerful climate engineering technologies creates an
environment where the potential detrimental effects of climate
engineering are amplified or unrestricted, such an environment
also prevents the public at large from enjoying climate
engineering’s potential benefits.59 One author has noted that
“[f]oreseeably, potential trade in geoengineering-related goods
and services would be highly sensitive, given that the publicgoods character of climate change mitigation and adaptation
efforts could potentially be hampered by considerations around
the protection of private interests.”60
Namely, these considerations include private organizations
restricting use of their climate engineering technologies by other
individuals or organizations with the purpose of maximizing the
profitability of those technologies. However, exclusive use in
cases like these could potentially come at the cost of meaningful
development of those technologies.61
This possibility is
particularly troubling in the field of climate engineering. With

55. See, e.g., Daniela Lai, Deployment of Geoengineering by the Private and Public
Sector: Can the Risks of Geoengineering Ever Be Effectively Regulated?, 37 LOY. L.A. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 341, 342 (2016); Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis-Yelaghotis,
Geoengineering a Future for Humankind: Some Technical and Ethical Considerations, 2012
CCLR 128, 130 (2012); Chavez, supra note 3, at 9.
56. Lai, supra note 55, at 361.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See Leal-Arcas & Filis-Yelaghotis, supra note 55, at 141.
60. Id. at 144.
61. See Chavez, supra note 3, at 13-14.
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the state of international deliberations on the subject of reductions
in GHG emissions unable to provide binding, meaningful
progress so as to adequately mitigate or reverse the effects of
climate change, it is increasingly necessary to supplement any
such international agreements with well-researched technologies.
Under the patents system, patent holders are provided twenty
years of completely exclusive use of their designs, at the end of
which they are required to disclose their inventions, thus
“facilitat[ing] the development of successive inventions, thereby
fostering technological advancement.”62 However, climate
engineering technologies are distinguishable from the everyday
inventions due to their incredible value, not just economically to
those firms able to secure adequate funding to research them, but
also as a potential solution to the wide range of health and public
safety risks associated with unmitigated climate change.63 Thus,
there is a compelling public policy interest in ensuring that these
technologies can be distributed throughout the industry quickly
and efficiently.
“Compulsory licensing” refers generally “to the grant of
permission for an enterprise seeking to use another’s intellectual
property to do so without the consent of its proprietor.”64
Historical instances of compulsory licenses in the United States
are limited and, while a number of general compulsory licensing
laws have been proposed in Congress,65 the United States, unlike
many of its trading partners,66 does not include a general
provision on compulsory licensing in its patent codes.67

62. Id. at 9.
63. See generally Leal-Arcas & Filis-Yelaghotis, supra note 55, at 141.
64. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RES. SERV., R43266, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF
PATENTED INVENTIONS 1 (2014).
65. See Kristopher Lancial, Compulsory Patent Licensing: The Next Step in Adapting
Patents to the Technological Age, 18 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 59, 64 (2013); A. Jason
Mirabito, Compulsory Patent Licensing for the United States: A Current Proposal, 57 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y 404, 431-32 (1975).
66. THOMAS, supra note 64, at 9.
67. Id. at 6.
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B. International Law on Compulsory Licensing
Although it lacks a universal compulsory licensing
provision, the United States is party to the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPs
Agreement),68 an international agreement that went into effect in
1995 and “significantly affected the manner in which the
international community utilizes compulsory patents.”69 In
relevant part, the TRIPs Agreement provides “for other use of the
subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right
holder, including use by the government or third parties
authorized by the government[.]”70 Additionally, nations which
are party to the TRIPs Agreement are authorized to institute
measures that “prevent the abuses which might result from the
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by [a] patent,”71 and
Article 30 of the TRIPs Agreement allows for “limited exceptions
to . . . exclusive rights”72 when “necessary to protect public health
and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance”73 and to prevent “abuse of intellectual property
rights.”74
The lack of an overarching compulsory licensing provision
in United States patent law reflects a general hesitancy in the
United States to issue such licensing.75 The United States
generally does not utilize compulsory licensing as an instrument
against private corporations for the sake of competition, reserving
it as a punitive measure against corporations that are found to
have violated antitrust law.76
68. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Sept. 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1197.
69. Lancial, supra note 65, at 63.
70. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note
68.
71. Paris Convention for the Protect. of Indus. Prop., Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583.
72. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note
68.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPs Agreement:
Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941, 953 (2000).
76. Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to
Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH 389, 392 n.13 (2002).
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The sets of legislation on compulsory licensing in other
nations, however, provide a much more vibrant landscape to
explore, particularly in some developing nations.77 Consistent
with both the TRIPs Agreement and the Paris Agreement, the vast
majority of nations belonging to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) have adopted compulsory licensing provisions.78 In
India, for example:
At any time after the expiration of three years from the
date a patent is granted, any interested person may make
an application to the Registrar of the Patent Office
seeking the grant of a compulsory license to work the
patented invention . . . . In determining whether or not
to grant such a license, the Registrar takes into account:
(1) the nature of the invention, the time which has
elapsed since the granting of the patent, and the
measures already taken by the patentee or any licensee
to make full use of the invention;
(2) the ability of the applicant to work the invention to
the public advantage; and
(3) the capacity of the applicant to undertake the risk in
providing capital and working the invention, if the
application is granted.79
Such compulsory licenses are typically applied to patents
registered in industries closely tied to public health and safety.80
For example, the first compulsory license granted by the Indian
Patents Office was granted in 2012 for the manufacture of a
particular pharmaceutical.81
The rationale behind compulsory licensing for the sake of
public health and safety is clear—if a patented product or process
is necessary to address a critical public health concern, it is in the
public’s best interest that the product or process be made available
to companies that would build on and distribute it, thus addressing
the public health concern.82 In such cases, the inventor’s interest
77. See, e.g., Chopra & Muthappa, supra note 49, at 35.
78. Saunders, supra note 76, at 438.
79. 6 DAVID M. EPSTEIN, ECKSTROM’S LICENSING IN FOR.EIGN & DOMESTIC.
OPERATIONS § 39:28 (2020).
80. Chopra & Muthappa, supra note 49, at 37.
81. Id. at 34.
82. Vaughan, supra note 50, at 88-89.
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in the patented product may be “subordinate” to that of the
public.83 However, there is not a precise or agreed-upon
definition of “public interest” in the international community as
it relates to compulsory licensing.
In nations where compulsory licensing is more common,
public interest-based compulsory licenses are generally issued
exclusively to regulate products that are considered especially
valuable to the general public.84 These licenses usually deal with
inventions and technologies relating to national defense, public
health, public safety, and/or general welfare.85 In these areas, the
particular interest serviced by an inventor’s patented invention is
more likely to be deemed superior to the inventor’s interests in
his or her intellectual property.86 In the instances when the United
States has imposed compulsory licenses, it has often been as a
remedy for violations of antitrust laws.87
One author connected the differing sentiments of various
nations toward compulsory licensing provisions to national
identity: the United States’ use of compulsory licensing as a
remedy for antitrust violations “reflect[s] the value of free
enterprise and competition in the United States[,]” while in the
Soviet Union, on the other hand, any technology is subject to a
compulsory license if it is deemed “of special importance to the
State.”88 Reflecting their shared common law ancestry, Canada
and the United Kingdom all share very similar laws with respect
to compulsory licensing, which provide a means for mandating
licensing of technologies that are not being worked, evidence of
a patent-holder’s “refusal to deal.”89 The United Kingdom also
recognizes an important public interest in the availability of

83. Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666, 670 (1988).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Lawrence Schlam, Compulsory Royalty-Free Licensing as an Antitrust
Remedy for Patent Fraud: Law, Policy and the Patent-Antitrust Interface Revisited, 7
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 501-02 (1998).
88. Fauver, supra note 83, at 670-71 (internal quotations omitted).
89. See id. at 672.
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affordable materials to produce food, medicine, and medical
equipment.90
Developing countries may also implement compulsory
licenses on foreign investors’ inventions so as to access
technologies that the pre-industrialized countries could not
develop otherwise.91 However, this limits the amount of control
such investors are able to exercise over a patented invention,
which has the effect of potentially driving away investors.
Legislatures in developing nations must, therefore, take these
opposing interests into account in creating compulsory licensing
legislation that both assuages the intellectual property concerns of
these foreign investors and expands access to the new
technologies which these investors own, and which can be critical
to their industrialization and further economic development.92
Compulsory licensing essentially “compels a patent owner
to allow certain others to practice the invention otherwise
protected by a patent.”93 In such cases, the government
essentially usurps the patent holder and takes over the patent
holder’s right to grant a license to a third party or some
government agency.94 Generally, the patent holder subsequently
receives a “reasonable royalty” for the license, as if the patent
holder had voluntarily licensed his or her invention.95
Compulsory licensing allows more widespread access to
certain inventions, which furthers innovation and may
compensate for situations in which a particular field has failed to
disseminate important technologies, as in cases where an
individual or corporation with monopoly access to a patented
invention exercises that power but chooses not to practice the
technology.96 Such non-use can create an environment that stifles

90. Id. at 671.
91. Id.
92. Id. For a more expansive discussion of compulsory licensing and patent systems
in developing nations see generally Fauver, supra note 83.
93. Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the Rescue: Disasters and Patent Law, 10
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 309, 336 (2007).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with Intellectual
Property Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH & ENVTL. L.
51, 59 (2005).
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technological advancement and impairs future researchers’
attempts to continue innovation by acquiring and building on
patented technologies.97 Furthermore, compulsory licenses can
be especially critical to promoting continued innovation in fields
which touch on issues of public health and safety or otherwise
have some significant social value.98
Even so, the United States has been generally hesitant to
enact legislation to implement a general provision for compulsory
licensing.99 There have, however, been a limited number of
instances where compulsory licensing has been used to resolve
legal disputes. Such was the case in 1956, when the United States
negotiated agreements with International Business Machines
(IBM) and American Telegraph & Telephone (AT&T) to license
their inventions.100 The compulsory licensing of these patents is
now recognized for “fostering the rapid growth of the
semiconductor industry.”101
The United States has dabbled in compulsory licensing not
only on an individual basis with specific private entities, but has
also enacted limited, albeit significant pieces of legislation with
compulsory licensing provisions. The Clean Air Act (CAA),102
the Atomic Energy Act (AEA),103 and the Plant Variety
Protection Act (PVPA)104, all contain conditional provisions
under which certain types of technology must be licensed for
public use. In particular, the Clean Air Act provides for the
97. See id. at 60.
98. Rose, supra note 4, at 579-627.
99. Id.
100. Chavez, supra note 3, at 22 (“The agreement with AT&T required that it license
at reasonable royalties all patents controlled by a subsidiary, Bell Systems. Similarly, the
IBM decree required that it grant nonexclusive, nontransferable licenses for all of its patents
to any applicant at reasonable royalties. Accordingly, the applicant was obligated to cross
license its patents to IBM on similar terms.”).
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (Providing mandatory licensing of air pollution prevention
inventions under Title 42, the Public Health and Welfare).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (Allowing for compulsory licenses of any patent which is
determined to be “affected with the public interest” so long as its primary purpose is “the
production or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy[.]”).
104. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321, 2404 (Enabling the Secretary of the United States Department
of Agriculture to declare a compulsory license allowing the use of a patented variety of plant
for two years in limited cases where such a license is necessary to maintain a sufficient food
supply).
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compulsory licensing of patents for pollution control devices,
acknowledging even in 1970 that technologies with the potential
to substantially reduce emissions are critical to public health and
safety.105 Recognizing that the aim of the Clean Air Act—”to
improve air quality through the implementation of a regulatory
scheme designed to stimulate private development of airpollution-control technology”—would result in the invention of
critically important technologies, Congress included a means by
which individual states may acquire compulsory licenses to
inventions in furtherance of attaining federally-mandated airquality standards.106 “If the state can satisfy a set of requirements,
then the U.S. Attorney General certifies that application to a
district court, which may order the patentee to license the
invention upon reasonable terms.”107
“Compulsory licensing schemes are justified on the ground
that they increase public access to inventions.”108 Should the
United States seek to apply compulsory licenses to particular
climate engineering technologies, this is likely the theory under
which those compulsory licenses would be justified. Opponents
of compulsory licensing have argued that this theory is not
grounded in reality; rather, that the type of patent nonuse, or
suppression, that might justify a compulsory license is mere
myth,109 and that “[a]nyone who invests the time and money to
develop a new invention and goes through the trouble to obtain
patent protection would probably exploit the invention to realize
a return on that investment.”110 There have, however, been a
number of instances of such patent suppression in the United
States, including in the fields of pharmaceuticals and automotive
engineering.111 Thus, it is to the advantage of American markets
105. Fauver, supra note 86, at 670.
106. Chavez, supra note 3, at 24.
107. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7608). “The Clean Air Act requires a party to satisfy three
requirements to obtain a license. First, the patented technology is not ‘reasonably available’
yet ‘necessary to comply with an air-quality standard; second, ‘no reasonable alternative
methods’ exist; and third, the unavailability of such technology may cause a ‘substantial
lessening of competition.’” Id. at 24 n.204.
108. Fauver, supra note 83, at 671.
109. Id. at 674-75.
110. Id. at 675.
111. For a discussion of the history of patent nonuse and how such nonuse leads to
patent suppression in the United States, see Saunders, supra note 76.
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and the public to have a system in place to prevent such patent
suppression in the field of climate engineering and a system that
embraces the idea of compulsory licensing on climate engineering
technologies could potentially do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mitigating the effects of climate change in the United States
and throughout the world is vitally important to guarantee public
health and safety in the coming decades. One avenue that society
has yet to meaningfully explore on a large scale in order to
achieve that mitigation is climate engineering technology. This
technology, when properly developed, tested, and distributed,
may unlock new insights into society’s efforts to counter the
effects of unmitigated climate change. Thus, it is necessary for
these patented technologies to be easily accessed, assessed, and
improved-upon by the entities and corporations that would use
them to combat climate change.
Additionally, the limitations of international institutions and
agreements in combating climate change have created a
regulatory environment that does not go far enough to actually
prevent the impeding disastrous effects of climate change. Thus,
the United States seems primed to embrace not just meaningful
climate engineering efforts, but to guarantee that the benefits of
climate engineering technologies are available to the public
through the limited use of compulsory licensing in the industry.
The United States’ previous dabbling in compulsory licensing, as
well as robust compulsory licensing frameworks in other nations,
provide a clear path toward implementing the doctrine effectively
in the United States, and doing so could bring the United States
and the world one step closer to combating the long-term effects
of climate change.

